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Abstract
We examine the influence of introducing public authority liability in the context of 
disasters. In an ideal setting a rule of comparative negligence would incentivise the 
government to take an optimal amount of care. The citizen, being the residual bearer 
of the loss, would consequently also take optimal care. However, in the specific con-
text of disasters, public authority liability may backfire and lead to more losses than 
without such liability. We argue that under some circumstances perverse incentives 
of citizens may increase with liability. We focus inter alia on (1) the difficulties that 
may exist to incentivise public authorities through liability rules, (2) the specific 
characteristics of comparative negligence that may make public authorities liable for 
the lion’s share of the damages, (3) the problem of negative expected value suits and 
(4) the fact that public authorities may be much more inclined to intervene ex post 
when damages exceed a threshold.
Keywords Public authority liability · Disaster insurance · Comparative negligence · 
Negative expected value suits
Introduction
Recently a lot of attention has been given  to the question of how various instru-
ments which are used to compensate victims of a disaster affect ex ante disaster risk 
reduction. The traditional way of dealing with ex post recovery was to use taxpay-
ers’ money to provide ad hoc compensation to disaster victims. Ad hoc refers to the 
fact that in some cases, often based on political needs, compensation is provided 
and in others it is not. In other systems, compensation is provided via a structural 
compensation fund. These funds also rely on the contributions of taxpayers, but the 
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conditions under which compensation is provided are more or less specified in a 
structural manner in legislation. Still, the question whether the disaster fund will 
compensate often depends upon political arguments. This ex post compensation to 
victims has been seriously criticised in the law and economics literature (see, e.g., 
Epstein 1996; Kaplow 1991). The general critique is that ex post recovery creates 
a moral hazard problem: since victims will expect the government to compensate 
them ex post, there is a weakening of ex ante incentive to seek prevention. There is, 
however, another potentially perverse effect that may play a role in the case of com-
pensation for victims of disasters. Public choice literature indicates that politicians 
can gain substantial advantages from ex post compensation, and as a result there will 
be a tendency to overcompensate ex post and to underinvest ex ante. The problem is 
that investments in ex ante prevention may not pay off during the term of office of 
the politician and therefore may not provide sufficient political rewards (Depoorter 
2006). But from the victim’s perspective the problem is that this guarantee of politi-
cally motivated ex post compensation is only present in the case where the loss will 
actually be qualified as the result of a disaster. Consequently, a second cause of per-
verse incentives among victims may emerge: victims have (at least a partial) interest 
in the damage being relatively large in order to increase the likelihood of ex post 
government compensation. Hence, this may be an additional argument why victims 
lack incentives for ex ante investments in prevention or for investing in damage miti-
gation after the disaster has occurred. In the case of relatively small damages, the 
political interest to intervene will be lower, thus creating an incentive for victims to 
contribute to larger damages in order to be able to count on government compensa-
tion ex post.
The question we are interested in is how the prospect of public authority liability 
could affect the incentives of victims. If there is indeed a problem that victims may 
have perverse incentives in the sense that they would prefer relatively large dam-
age, one could argue that this tendency could be countered by using public authority 
liability. The argument would be that many natural disasters are caused through the 
negligence of public authorities, and as a result, the victims could try to hold the 
public authority liable for the compensation of their losses. In contrast to ex post 
recovery, compensation in the case of public authority liability is not limited to cata-
strophic losses; therefore, on first consideration it might seem that making more use 
of public authority liability could counteract the potentially perverse incentives of 
victims in case of ex post recovery. Moreover, since public authority liability would 
apply in a normal tort context if victims had taken insufficient preventive measures 
ex ante or had not sufficiently mitigated the damage ex post, it could potentially lead 
to comparative negligence. In case of comparative negligence, the victim’s right to 
compensation would be reduced according to their contribution to the loss.
In this article, however, we will show that there is a danger that under particular 
circumstances these perverse incentives of victims may not be reduced by introduc-
ing public authority liability. We look at a situation of bilateral care. This is gener-
ally qualified in the literature as a situation where the incidence of harm and/or its 
extent can be limited by investments of both the injurer (here the government) and 
the victim (here the citizen) (Shavell 1987, p. 11). In an ideal setting a rule of com-
parative negligence would incentivise the government to spend an optimal amount 
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on care. The citizen, being the residual bearer of the loss, would consequently also 
take optimal care. However, public authority liability may backfire and lead to more 
losses than if there were no such liability. We focus on the circumstances under 
which perverse incentives of citizens may increase under a system with liability, 
thereby increasing the cost of disasters. We focus inter alia on (1) the fact that public 
authorities may be much more inclined to intervene ex post when damages exceed 
a certain threshold. With respect to this issue, we provide empirical data concern-
ing several countries where victims largely rely on compensation provided by the 
government; (2) the possible difficulty of incentivising public authorities through 
liability rules; (3) specific characteristics of comparative negligence that may make 
public authorities liable for the lion’s share of the damages; and (4) the problem of 
negative expected value suits for relatively small damages (and the fact that existing 
instruments to foster small but strong claims are often inadequate).
A few issues need to be clarified. First, we focus on the potentially perverse effect 
of recovery on ex ante incentives of victims. Recovery is the ex post intervention 
needed to return the social welfare trajectory to where it would have been had the 
disaster never occurred (Leonard and Howitt 2010). It has been pointed out that 
similar perverse effects do not occur in case of relief, which concerns the provi-
sion of temporary shelter, transitional housing and other rescue efforts (Suggerman 
2007, p. 32). For that reason we disregard relief in this article. Second, we largely 
focus on natural hazards and therefore not on so-called man-made or technological 
hazards.1 Note, however, that it is claimed that many natural disasters are caused 
by negligent decisions of governments (for example, granting building permits for 
flood-prone areas). As a result, the boundary between natural and man-made disas-
ters is blurred, giving rise to public authority liability, which is the central focus of 
our article. The third preliminary remark concerns the fact that we concentrate on ex 
post government compensation (ad hoc or via funds) and public authority liability 
as compensation tools, and we analyse how those ex post mechanisms affect ex ante 
incentives of victims for prevention. We do not analyse yet another ex post compen-
sation instrument, disaster insurance, which is considered to have more beneficial 
effects on providing victims with adequate incentives for prevention (see Kunreuther 
1968; Priest 1996). Including insurance would needlessly complicate the analysis. 
Moreover, some of the problems we address (such as perverse incentives) would no 
longer exist, precisely because they would be prevented through the control of moral 
hazard by insurers.2
We proceed as follows. First, we offer a brief literature overview and indicate the 
importance of several instruments that we discuss in the following section in order 
to provide the academic and policy setting. We subsequently develop the model and 
unpack several of its elements. The final section concludes.
1 On this distinction, see Bruggeman (2010, p. 8).
2 Strongly advocated by Kunreuther (2006).
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Academic and policy context
We will briefly sketch the various developments in the literature concerning the 
interdependencies between ex post compensation for disaster victims and ex ante 
incentives for disaster risk reduction. We will also provide some policy context that 
will enable the reader to better understand the issues at stake.
Countries use quite a variety of different models to compensate victims of catas-
trophes (Faure and Hartlief 2006). Some countries (like Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands) have no specific regime in place3: no specific regulatory measures have 
been implemented, so governments may provide compensation for victims on an ad 
hoc basis. In other jurisdictions a compensation fund for victims has been created to 
provide partial (but unlike tort law, typically not full) compensation. Such a disaster 
fund exists inter alia in Belgium and Austria. In a third type of compensation model, 
regulation mandates that first-party home insurance coverage should be extended to 
include natural disasters. This approach is used in France, Belgium and Taiwan and 
is also being discussed in Germany and Italy (Faure 2007, p. 340). A fourth model 
is one in which public–private partnerships are developed, whereby the state inter-
venes to facilitate private insurance. This model is applied in the U.S., for example, 
with the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) and the National Flood Insurance 
Plan (NFIP) (see further Bruggeman et al. 2012).
The focus of our article is on the model where the government provides ex post 
compensation either ad hoc or via a structural compensation fund. The literature has 
been very critical of this ex post compensation, arguing that it will provide perverse 
incentives to potential victims not to take effective preventive measures. Ex post 
government compensation was qualified by Epstein as ‘catastrophic response to cat-
astrophic risk’ (Epstein 1996). Ex post compensation may also create the problem 
of diluting incentives to purchase ex ante insurance, since victims can simply take 
a free ride on the state. This problem has been referred to as the ‘charity hazard’ 
(Coate 1995; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). Ex post compensation may 
further lead to a negative redistributional effect, since some victims (who probably 
purchased houses at lower prices in flood-prone areas) may take a free ride on the 
general taxpayers, who finance the ex post relief (Faure 2013, p. 257). However, it 
was recently pointed out that this criticism of ex post intervention by the govern-
ment only applies to ex post recovery (compensation to victims) and not to immedi-
ate relief during the disaster, as the latter will not have the same negative effects on 
incentives for disaster risk reduction (Dari-Mattiacci and Faure 2015).
Depoorter also indicated that politicians may receive too little reward from ex 
ante disaster management policies, and as a result, these policies may be undersup-
plied. The political reward for ex post compensation may on the contrary be very 
strong, and therefore ex post compensation is likely to be oversupplied (Depoorter 
2006).
3 As we will explain below, the Netherlands does have a specific act dealing with compensation for vic-
tims of disasters, but because it is only rarely applied in practice it does not play a major role.
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There is overwhelming evidence of ad hoc compensation when damage is rela-
tively large. For example, in Germany after the ‘flood of the century’ of the river 
Elbe in 2002, ad hoc compensation was provided through the so-called Flutopfer-
hilfesolidaritätsgesetz, which provided a total amount of compensation of EUR 8.1 
billion (Magnus 2006, p. 133). In Italy the amounts paid by the government as ad 
hoc compensation are on average EUR 3.5 to 4 billion per year; consequently, a rel-
evant share of the state’s yearly budget is devoted to repairing damage resulting from 
catastrophes (Monti and Chiaves 2006, pp. 169–171).
There is also evidence that disaster compensation can often be politically moti-
vated. For example, Gerrett and Sobel showed this for the disaster expenditures of 
the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency: states that are politically 
important to the president have a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, 
and disaster expenditures are higher in states that have congressional representation 
on FEMA oversight committees (Garrett and Sobel 2003). Hence, they argue that 
nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather than by need.
There is no data on the efforts of individual victims as far as disaster mitigation 
is concerned. However, there is some evidence that politicians do indeed system-
atically underinvest in disaster mitigation. For example, substantial amounts were 
paid in ex post recovery after hurricane Katrina. Total costs for Katrina were (as of 
February 2006) estimated to be USD 96 billion: 300,000 homes were destroyed or 
rendered uninhabitable and 1330 people died. Hurricane Katrina was far more costly 
than the total estimated damage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which was reported to 
be approximately USD 18 billion (Townsend 2006, p. 7). However, there is equally 
overwhelming evidence that ex ante efforts in disaster risk mitigation were largely 
lacking. Indeed, many reports issued after Katrina point to serious underinvestment 
with respect to preparedness, particularly by public authorities (both FEMA and 
state authorities); reports on desirable precautionary efforts taken by individuals are 
not available. For example, the Select Bipartisan Committee report, A Failure of Ini-
tiative, states that FEMA sustained losses of USD 80 million and USD 90 million in 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and that “these budget reductions were preventing FEMA 
officials from maintaining adequate levels of trained and ready staff.”4 The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security presented similar data, reporting inter alia that between 
1995 and 2003 FEMA’s budget decreased to such an extent that the organisation was 
“unable to conduct a large-scale catastrophic event exercise.”5
When losses are not considered “catastrophic”, there is no ex post government 
compensation, and hence the victims need to look for other solutions to seek redress. 
In some cases they may still look to the government. It is theoretically possible to 
imagine situations where public authorities would be at fault in the case of a nat-
ural disaster. In fact, some scholars have held that there are no natural disasters; 
4 H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 7 (2006) [hereinafter A Failure of Initiative], available at http://katri 
na.house .gov/full_katri na_repor t.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2015), at 156.
5 Office of Inspector Gen., Office of Inspections & Special Rev., Department of Homeland Security, 
OIG-06-32, A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurri-
cane Katrina 13–17 (2006) [hereinafter A Performance Review], at 129.
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rather, there are natural events that turn into disasters as a result of human interven-
tion (O’Keefe et al. 1976, p. 566; Zeckhauser 1996, p. 134). Indeed, there are many 
ways, particularly through the design of critical infrastructure, to reduce the prob-
ability of damage or mitigate the seriousness of the consequences ex ante (Leonard 
and Howitt 2010, p. 18). Precautionary measures to reduce the likelihood of disas-
ters can be taken by individuals but also—especially where large-scale measures are 
concerned—by governments as well. Many disasters can be prevented, and a lack of 
precautionary measures is often the real reason why natural events have catastrophic 
consequences (O’Keefe et al. 1976, p. 566). Failure to prevent a disaster or to take 
adequate measures to mitigate the damage can therefore in some cases be attributed 
to a government. For example, it could be held that the government failed to give an 
adequate warning (e.g., in case of flooding), or it could be questioned why govern-
ments give building permits to build houses in flood-prone areas or on the slopes of 
active volcanoes.
Critical questions concerning the role of public authorities are often asked when 
a natural disaster causes substantial damage. For example, in the case of Hurricane 
Katrina, Shughart showed that no effective precautionary measures had been taken 
before Katrina was announced because of bureaucratic myopia, inertia, and corrup-
tion (Shughart 2006). As a consequence, the question of governmental responsibil-
ity was raised in the wake of Katrina.6 However, most of those lawsuits were not 
successful.7 Even when there is only a low probability that a public authority could 
be found negligent, politicians may have a strong incentive to compensate victims 
of disasters, especially in cases that get ample media coverage. In the case of flood 
damage in the Dutch village of Wilnis, for example, public authority liability was 
denied (see the next paragraph), but the government still intervened through soli-
darity payments (see section “The probability of government intervention increases 
with damage”).
One reason why lawsuits are often not brought against public authorities in the 
case of natural disasters is that governments generously intervene with public aid. In 
the case of Katrina, for example, a report of the U.S. Senate refers to a total amount 
of USD 88 billion that the U.S. Federal Government committed as of 8 March 2006 
to the response, recovery and rebuilding efforts.8
Victims have so far not been very successful in holding public authorities liable 
for the consequences of disasters. One of the rare cases where public authority lia-
bility was accepted was in France after the disastrous flooding at Grand Bornand 
on 14 July 1987, which caused the death of 23 persons as well as substantial dam-
age to property. A sudden thunderstorm in the mountains caused two rivers to surge 
6 See Walters and Kettl (2006). For the failures of planning and response in relation to Katrina in gen-
eral, see Bier (2006).
7 See Schleifstein (2013), https ://www.nola.com/envir onmen t/index .ssf/2013/12/feder al_judge _dismi 
sses_most_o.html; see also Levitt and Whitaker (2009, p. 207); https ://www.usato day.com/story /news/
natio n/-2013/12/28/judge -ends-katri na-flood ing-lawsu its-again st-feds/42332 17/.
8 Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Kat-
rina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Executive Summary, May 2006, at 17, available at http://www.disas tersr 
us.org/katri na.
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very rapidly and wash away camping grounds located near the river. Both the state 
and the local authorities were sued and were held liable by the Court of Appeals of 
Lyon. The state was held liable for a lack of care in authorising the development of 
a camping ground in an area likely to be flooded by a mountain torrent; the munici-
pality had an obligation to give a warning of possible danger but had not done so 
(For details see Cannarsa et al. 2006, pp. 94–95). Victims in the Netherlands were 
less successful in a case where a 150-year-old dike along a canal became weaker 
during the dry summer of 2003 and failed to hold back water. The dike break led to 
substantial damage in the village of Wilnis, which belongs to the municipality De 
Ronde Venen. The municipality sued the regional water board that was responsible 
for maintaining the dike for compensation for the flood damage caused to nearby 
housing in the village of Wilnis. The case went all the way up to the Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad), which, in its decision of 17 December 2010, denied the liability of the 
regional water board.9 The Hoge Raad held that a dike can also constitute a struc-
ture within the meaning of the strict liability rule of Article 6:174 of the Civil Code 
regarding the liability of the owner of a defective construction. However, the Hoge 
Raad held that in addressing the question of the defectiveness of the dike the court 
should take into account the state of the art of building a peat dike at the time of 
the construction, as well as the available financial means of the water board. Also, 
the extraordinary circumstances of the case should be taken into account as well as 
the fact that the hazard (possible defectiveness of the dike after a long drought) was 
unknown to the owner of the dike. As a result, the liability of the public authority 
(more particularly the regional water board)10 was denied (Giesen and Keirse 2011, 
pp. 428–431).
Some legislators have reacted by creating immunities for public authorities in 
order to limit the scope of government liability. Recent scholarship has defended 
those immunities, arguing that public authorities are multitasking agents that need 
a large margin of discretion because they have to weigh up various externalities (De 
Geest 2012). A public authority liability that is too extensive could potentially lead 
to so-called chilling effects (De Mot and Faure 2014). Notwithstanding these theo-
retical objections, it has also been argued that there is serious potential for public 
authority liability precisely because, as we mentioned before, politicians tend to 
underinvest in precautionary efforts that will not lead to substantial political gains 
during their term of office (Faure 2016, p. 114).
This leads us to the core focus of our contribution. On first sight, public authority 
liability could play an important role in providing incentives for disaster risk reduc-
tion. It could be the symbolic stone that kills two birds: on the one hand, public 
authority liability could provide better incentives to authorities to invest adequately 
in disaster risk reduction; on the other hand, it could—because of the compara-
tive negligence defence—counteract the perverse incentives of victims and could, 
therefore, also provide potential victims with appropriate incentives for disaster risk 
9 Hoge Raad, 17 December 2010, NJ 2012/155.
10 The municipality of Ronde Venen (where Wilnis was located) acted as a victim to claim compensa-
tion.
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reduction. However, as we will show in a model in the next section, these expecta-
tions may be too optimistic for a number of reasons.
The model
Notations and assumptions
In our model the government needs to decide whether or not to take precaution-
ary measures to reduce the probability of harm due to a disaster. The victim cannot 
affect the probability of harm but can take some precautions to mitigate the level 
of harm. We compare two alternative legal frameworks: a solidarity system and a 
negligence system. In the solidarity system the government compensates a fraction 
of the victim’s loss if that loss exceeds a certain threshold. In case the loss does not 
exceed the threshold, the victim receives nothing. The alternative is a rule of com-
parative negligence. Under this liability rule the government compensates the victim 
for the full loss if the victim took care but the government did not, and for a fraction 
of the loss if neither the victim nor the government took care. In all other situations 
the victim bears the full loss. We further assume that the parties are risk-neutral and 
that they bear the costs of the trial themselves (i.e., the American rule of cost alloca-
tion applies).
We will use the following notations:
p0: the probability of harm if the government takes no care
p1: the probability of harm if the government takes care (with p1 < p0)
H0: the harm if the potential victim takes no care to reduce the harm
H1: the harm if the potential victim takes care to reduce the harm (H1 < H0)
c: the prevention costs of the victim
α: the share of the harm the government compensates in the absence of public 
authority liability (0 < α < 1)
T: the threshold level in the solidarity system (if the harm < T, then there is no 
compensation; if the harm ≥ T, the compensation equals α times the harm)
β: the share of the harm the victim obtains in compensation when both the gov-
ernment and the victim took insufficient care under a rule of comparative negli-
gence (0 < β < 1)
Cp: the litigation costs of the plaintiff under comparative negligence when the 
government failed to take care but the victim did take care
C′p: the litigation costs of the plaintiff under comparative negligence when both 
the government and the victim failed to take care
Our model makes some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the par-
ties do not have an opportunity to settle the case. All disputes end up in court. Sec-
ond, when the victim takes no care (takes care), there is only one possible level of 
damages H0(H1), and the victim can perfectly predict ex ante whether H0 > T > H1 
or not. In the section “Relaxing some assumptions” we look at the consequences of 
relaxing these assumptions.
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The solidarity system
We start with the solidarity system and look at the situation where H0 > T > H1 . 
The victim’s loss equals c + piH1 when the victim takes care (with i = 0 if the gov-
ernment does not take care, and i = 1 if the government does take care): the victim 
pays for the costs of taking care, and there is a probability of pi that a loss of H1 will 
occur (given that the victim takes care). Since that loss does not exceed the thresh-
old T, the victim does not receive any compensation. If the victim does not take 
care, the victim’s loss equals (1 − α)piH0: the victim does not incur any precaution 
costs, but there is a probability that a loss H0 will occur (given that the victim does 
not take care). Since the loss exceeds the threshold, the victim will receive a part 
(α) of the loss as compensation and will receive no compensation for the other part 
(1 − α). Clearly, the victim will take no care if the loss is larger when taking care 
than when not taking care, thus if c + piH1 > (1 − α)piH0.
The perverse incentive of the victim not to take care clearly increases the victim’s 
prevention cost with the share of the harm the government compensates when the 
loss exceeds the threshold and with the level of harm if the potential victim takes 
care (as long as H1 < T). The incentive decreases with the probability of harm11 and 
with the level of harm if the potential victim takes no care.
Comparative negligence
Under a rule of comparative negligence, in case the government takes care, the vic-
tim can decide to take care as well, or to take no care. If the victim takes care, the 
victim’s loss equals c + p1H1: the victim pays for the cost of care, and there is a prob-
ability of p1 (since the government takes care) that the victim will suffer a loss of H1 
(given that the victim takes care and the government also takes care and will there-
fore not have to compensate any loss). If the victim does not take care, the victim’s 
loss is simply p1H0: given that the government takes care, the probability of a loss 
is p1, and the level of the losses equals H0, since the victim did not take care. The 
victim bears the full loss, since the government took care. The victim prefers to take 
care as long as c + p1H1 < p1H0, thus as long as c < p1H0 − p1H1. We can conclude 
that when the government takes care, the victim takes care as long as it is efficient 
to do so.
Now we look at the situation in which the government takes no care. This situ-
ation is more complex, because in order to obtain compensation from the govern-
ment, the trial costs of the victim need to be relatively low compared to the expected 
value of a trial. If the victim takes care, the victim’s loss equals c + p0Cp if Cp ≤ H1: 
since the victim has a positive expected value suit, the victim will be able to sue 
and obtain compensation for the loss. However, the victim bears the cost of trial 
(the American rule applies). If however Cp > H1, the victim has a negative expected 
value suit and will not be able to go to court to obtain compensation. In that case, 
11 c + piH1 > (1 − 𝛼)piH0 can be rewritten as 
c
pi
+ H
1
> (1 − 𝛼)H
0
.
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the victim’s total loss equals c + p0H1. If the victim takes no care, whether the victim 
will have a positive or a negative expected value suit depends on whether H0 ≥ C′p 
or not (βH0 is the fraction of the harm that the government will need to compen-
sate under a rule of comparative negligence when both parties were negligent). 
If the victim has a positive expected value suit ( H0 ≥ C′p ), then the victim’s loss 
equals p0[(1 − )H0 + C�p]. However, if the victim has a negative expected value suit 
( 𝛽H0 < C′p ), then the victim’s loss equals p0H0. Unlike the situation where the gov-
ernment takes care, the decision of the victim whether to take care or not depends on 
several factors when the government does not take care. Formally, when the govern-
ment does not take care, the victim will take no care if:
In all four situations the incentive of the victim not to take care increases with the 
cost of taking care and decreases with the probability of harm and with the level of harm 
if the potential victim takes no care. In the first and the second situations the incentive 
also increases with the plaintiff’s litigation costs in case the plaintiff takes care but the 
government does not. In the third and the fourth situations the incentive increases with 
the level of harm in case the victim takes care. In the first and the third situations the 
incentive increases with the share of the harm the victim obtains in compensation when 
both the government and the victim took insufficient care, and decreases with the litiga-
tion costs of the plaintiff when both the government and the victim failed to take care.
Comparison of the solidarity system and comparative negligence
We can now compare the victim’s incentives under a solidarity system and a rule of 
comparative negligence (and more specifically in the situation in which the govern-
ment takes no care). We need to distinguish between four different situations that are 
possible:
(1) We start with the situation in which under a rule of comparative negligence 
the plaintiff’s claim has positive expected value only if the plaintiff did not 
take care ( Cp > H1 and 𝛽H0 ≥ C�p) . In this situation the victim will take no 
care if c + p0H1 > p0[(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C�p] under comparative negligence, while he 
or she will take no care under the solidarity system if c + p0H1 > (1 − α)p0H0. 
Clearly, the incentive not to take care may be worse under comparative negli-
gence. This will be the case when p0[(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C�p] < (1 − 𝛼)p0H0 , thus if 
(𝛽 − 𝛼)H0 − C
�
p
> 0.
c + p0Cp > p0
[
(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C
�
p
]
in case Cp ≤ H1 and 𝛽H0 ≥ C
�
p
c + p0Cp > p0H0 in case Cp ≤ H1 and 𝛽H0 < C
�
p
c + p0H1 > p0
[
(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C
�
p
]
in case Cp > H1 and 𝛽H0 ≥ C
�
p
c + p0H1 > p0H0 in case Cp > H1 and 𝛽H0 < C
�
p
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(2) We now turn to the situation in which under comparative negligence the plain-
tiff’s claim has positive expected value whether he or she took care or not 
(  Cp ≤ H1 and H0 ≥ C′p ) .  Here the victim will  take no care if 
c + p0Cp > p0
[
(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C
�
p
]
. Under the solidarity system the victim will take 
no care if c + p0H1 > (1 − α)p0H0. Once again, the incentive not to take care may 
be worse under comparative negligence. This will be the case if 
c + p0Cp − p0
[
(1 − 𝛽)H0 + C
�
p
]
> c + p0H1 − (1 − 𝛼)p0H0, thus if (β − α)H0 − 
 C′
p
 − (H1 − Cp) > 0. Note that, due to the fact that Cp ≤ H1, the incentive is more 
likely to be worse under comparative negligence in the situation in which the 
plaintiff’s claim has positive expected value only if the plaintiff did not take care 
(see situation 1 above) than in the situation in which the plaintiff’s claim has 
positive expected value whether the plaintiff took care or not. The reason is that 
in the former situation the victim receives nothing when taking care (and con-
sequently damages are relatively low) but in the latter situation still receives 
something ( H1 − Cp).
(3) When the plaintiff’s claim has negative expected value whether the plain-
tiff took care or not ( Cp ≤ H1 and H0 ≥ C�p) , the victim will take no care if 
c + p0H1 > p0H0, thus if c > p0H0 − p0H1. Note that under this condition we do 
not want the victim to take care, because the cost of taking care (c) outweighs 
the benefits of taking care ( p0H0 − p0H1). Intuitively, since the victim bears all 
the harm, the victim makes optimal decisions regarding taking care. Under the 
solidarity system the victim will take no care if c > (1 − 𝛼)p0H0 − p0H1. There-
fore, under that system the victim may still take no care, even though taking care 
would be efficient (this follows from the fact that 1 − α < 1).
(4) When the plaintiff’s claim has positive expected value only if the plaintiff took 
care ( Cp ≤ H1 and 𝛽H0 < C�p) , the victim will take no care if c + p0Cp > p0H0, 
thus if c > p0H0 − p0Cp . Clearly, the victim will take no care only when it is 
efficient to do so ( p0H0 − p0Cp > p0H0 − p0H1 given that Cp ≤ H1). Under a 
solidarity system, when the government takes no care, the victim takes no care 
if c + p0H1 > (1 − α)p0H0. Just as before, under that system the victim may still 
take no care, even though taking care would be efficient.
Relaxing some assumptions
Our model has made some simplifying assumptions. First, with respect to the com-
parative negligence rule, we have assumed that the parties do not have an oppor-
tunity to settle the case. All disputes end up in court. One could argue that when 
settlement is possible, plaintiffs will more often be able to obtain compensation even 
when the level of harm is relatively low, and this would make the perverse incen-
tives of the victim vanish. However, relaxing the assumption of no settlement is not 
likely to alter our results qualitatively. Even when we allow parties to settle in our 
model, when a suit has negative expected value, the defendant will usually not offer 
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any positive settlement amount.12 And with respect to positive expected value suits, 
a settlement will often reflect the superior bargaining power of the defendant, so 
that the ultimate settlement amount will be considerably lower than the expected 
judgement.
Second, when the victim takes no care (takes care), we have assumed there is 
only one possible level of damages H0(H1), and the victim can perfectly predict ex 
ante whether H0 > T > H1 or not. In reality of course, the victim will not be able 
to perfectly predict the level of damages when taking care or not. Also, the pre-
cise value of the threshold T may not be perfectly known in advance. Consequently, 
given a certain level of precaution, a victim will seldom be entirely sure that their 
loss will be qualified as the result of a disaster or not in the solidarity system. And in 
a negligence system the victim will likewise not be sure that their suit will have pos-
itive expected value in case of taking no care. Under both systems this will provide 
a counterweight against the perverse incentive of the victim. Whether this counter-
balancing effect will be large enough to induce the victim to take care when it is effi-
cient to do so will now also depend on the victim’s estimate of the probability of not 
receiving compensation when they take no care, and their degree of risk aversion.13
Summary
These are the main findings of our analysis:
(a) The perverse incentive for the victim not to take care can exist under both the 
solidarity system and under comparative negligence.
(b) Under comparative negligence the perverse incentive of the victim only exists 
when the government cannot be incentivised to take care.
(c) Under comparative negligence the perverse incentive of the victim only exists 
if the plaintiff’s claim has positive expected value when no care was taken. In 
that case, the perverse incentive is greater in the situation in which the plaintiff’s 
claim has negative expected value when the plaintiff takes care than in the situa-
tion in which the plaintiff’s claim has positive expected value when the plaintiff 
takes care.
(d) When perverse incentives could exist under both the solidarity system and com-
parative negligence, the probability that the perverse incentive is worse under 
a rule of comparative negligence than under the solidarity system increases 
with (1) the share of the harm the victim obtains in compensation when both 
the government and the victim took insufficient care under a rule of compara-
tive negligence, and decreases with (2) the share of the harm the government 
12 When the plaintiff has a negative expected value suit but the defendant is unsure about this, the plain-
tiff may obtain a positive settlement amount. But this amount will be (often considerably) lower than the 
expected judgement, because the defendant’s settlement offer will reflect the possibility that the plain-
tiff’s claim has negative expected value.
13 From a modelling perspective, our model could, for example, be altered by introducing a distribution 
for the victim’s loss when the victim took no care, with some values lower than T, and some values larger 
than T.
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compensates in the absence of public authority liability and (3) the litigation 
costs of the plaintiff under comparative negligence when both the government 
and the victim failed to take care. Furthermore, it (4) increases (decreases) with 
the level of harm when the potential victim takes no care to reduce the harm in 
case the share of the harm the victim obtains in compensation when both the 
government and the victim took insufficient care under a rule of comparative 
negligence is larger (smaller) than the share of the harm the government com-
pensates in the absence of public authority liability. When the plaintiff’s claim 
has positive expected value when the plaintiff takes care, it also increases with 
(5) the harm if the potential victim takes care to reduce the harm and decreases 
with (6) the litigation costs of the plaintiff under comparative negligence when 
the government failed to take care but the victim took care.
Unpacking the elements of the model
The probability of government intervention increases with damage
In the solidarity system the perverse incentive of the victim exists because the 
government does not compensate relatively small losses but does provide com-
pensation for (a fraction of) relatively large losses. The question arises whether 
this is realistic.
In order to test this hypothesis we will review the conditions under which the 
governments intervene in particular legal systems in the case of (natural) disasters. 
We will examine whether it really is so that the government only provides ex post 
recovery when a particular threshold is passed (i.e., the damage is relatively large). 
We will analyse this both by looking at statutory conditions (where available) and 
the compensation in practice. Indeed, if it seems that the government only inter-
venes in the case of relatively large losses, this would confirm the likelihood of per-
verse incentives of victims of a disaster as demonstrated in the model.
We will proceed as follows. We address compensation practice in four European 
countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The reason we have chosen 
these four legal systems is that they all have a regime, whereby ex post recovery 
for disasters is provided (either via a structural fund on a statutory basis or ad hoc). 
We deliberately did not choose a country like France where comprehensive disaster 
insurance exists. Note that in Belgium a comprehensive disaster insurance was intro-
duced in 2005, but the ex post recovery via the disaster fund has not been totally 
abolished (Bruggeman et al. 2011, pp. 768–772).
In Belgium the Act of 12 July 1976 created the so-called Disaster Fund. It is 
financed in the aftermath of a natural catastrophe by advances from the Treasury, 
loans and, where necessary, allocations drawn from the state budget, gifts, legacies, 
and profits from the national lottery. Interestingly, the Disaster Fund will only inter-
vene after a royal decree has recognised the existence of a disaster and its geographi-
cal area. In 1986 the government introduced the following criteria:
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– the total damage should be at least (at that time) 50,000 Belgian francs (EUR 
1.239.467);
– the average amount of damage per family should be 225.000 Belgian francs 
(EUR 5.577);
– a similar disaster only happens every 20 years (Van Nuffel 1995, p. 47; Durant 
2006, p. 60).
A more recent guidance note of the relevant Belgian agency of 2006 now indi-
cates that the Disaster Fund will only intervene when the disaster has caused a total 
of EUR 50 million in damage or when particular technical criteria have been ful-
filled. Those criteria can again be linked to the magnitude of the damage. For exam-
ple, for precipitation there should be a rainfall of at least 30 l/m2 per hour or 60 l/m2 
per 24 h.14 Hence, in 2006 the financial criterion was substantially increased com-
pared to the previous situation, whereas in the past a criterion of a minimum damage 
per household also applied. Since 2005 the importance of the Disaster Fund in Bel-
gium is somewhat reduced as a result of the introduction of a comprehensive disas-
ter cover for specific risks (Bruggeman et al. 2011, pp. 770–772). The Disaster Fund 
therefore only applies for risks not covered by the compulsory insurance.
Finally, we should mention that in the federal structure of Belgium the alloca-
tion of compensation to victims of disasters has been attributed to the regions since 
2014. The Flemish Region issued an order on 23 December 2016 concerning the 
compensation of damage caused by general disasters in the Flemish Region. Inter-
estingly, Article 2 of this order also holds that only natural phenomena that satisfy 
the financial criteria mentioned in Article 3 or specific technical criteria mentioned 
in Article 4 will be considered as a general disaster (which can lead to compensa-
tion). Article 3 holds that a natural phenomenon will be considered a disaster in the 
sense of the order when it has caused a damage of at least EUR 30 million to private 
and public property in the Flemish region.
In Germany the situation is different to Belgium in the sense that there is no 
structural disaster fund that determines ex ante the conditions under which compen-
sation is available to victims. Although a structural act specifying the conditions 
under which victims of disasters may receive compensation does not exist, there is 
relevant ad hoc legislation. For example, after the 2002 flood (which mostly hit the 
state of Saxony in eastern Germany, leading to 21 deaths and 110 people injured), 
the total property damage reached EUR 6198 billion (Magnus 2006, p. 140). Inter-
estingly, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted an ad hoc specific legislation for 
the compensation of the victims, the Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz, which estab-
lished a fund to support the victims of that catastrophe (Magnus 2006, p. 121). 
Although the 2002 Act only applies to the 2002 flood, legal doctrine argues that “it 
is very likely that the federal legislator would react in a rather similar way if other 
catastrophes of comparable size occurred” (Magnus 2006, p. 123). The Flutopfer-
hilfesolidaritätsgesetz created a solidarity fund to pay so-called Soforthilfe (limited 
financial assistance, similar to disaster relief) and, in addition, financial aid for the 
14 See https ://ibz.be/sites /defau lt/files /media /docs/omzen dbrie f_erken ning_ramp.pdf.
Public authority liability and the cost of disasters 
removal of the damage and for reconstruction (Aufbauhilfe). The financial means of 
the fund amounts to EUR 8,1 billion, financed by the tax payers of the Federation 
and the states (Magnus 2006, p. 124). The Act is specially designed to compen-
sate for property damage (Magnus 2006, p. 124). This example already underscores 
(again) our point that only when the damage is relatively large can the victims count 
on ex post recovery. Other incidents, more particularly floods, also confirm this pic-
ture. After a flood in 2013, another ad hoc catastrophe fund was created to compen-
sate the victims of the flood which mostly affected the state of Saxony-Anhalt. The 
total compensation was, according to a report of the German Bundestag (national 
parliament) more than EUR 6,6 billion.15
Italy follows the German model to a large extent. In other words, there is a 
national emergency fund which can be used after a state of emergency has been 
declared by the central government. The act on the state of emergency does not 
contain financial thresholds, but the regions need to estimate all losses and dam-
ages before applying for a state of emergency. In practice, the state of emergency 
(and thus the possibility to call on the National Emergency Fund) is only applied 
(and recognised) in case of large losses.16 The Italian government “spent on average 
EUR 3,5 to 4 billion each year to indemnify damages caused by catastrophic events” 
(Monti and Chiaves 2006, p. 169). State indemnification of disaster losses follows 
a routine procedure: the regional government proposes the declaration of a state of 
emergency, and as a result, state funding is provided for the victims (Monti and Chi-
aves 2006, p. 170). Legal doctrine in Italy holds that “the enactment of special laws 
and provisions indemnifying the owners of properties affected by single disasters 
generated a sort of reliance on the government by Italian citizens, who know they 
may always count on the state for recovery. This is one of the reasons why private 
insurance covering natural disasters has never fully developed in Italy” (Monti and 
Chiaves 2006, p. 170).
The civil protection department of Italy has a spreadsheet with all amounts that 
have been compensated by the National Emergency Fund since 1997. Most concern 
seismic events, but there is also damage resulting from extreme weather events. The 
spreadsheet shows a large amount of payments, underscoring the fact that the Ital-
ian government indeed pays substantial amounts, but it is also clear that in nearly all 
particular cases the amounts are several tens of millions of euros (with a few excep-
tions). This once again highlights our point.17
The Netherlands also constitutes a very interesting case. Before 1998 the Neth-
erlands had no structural compensation regime, and victims had to rely on ad hoc 
compensation. In 1998 the WTS (Calamities Compensation Act—an act for damage 
compensation in the event of catastrophes and large-scale incidents) was adopted. 
15 See Bericht zur Flutkatastrophe 2013: Katastrophenhilfe, Entschädigung, Wiederaufbau, Deutscher 
Bundestag 17.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 17/14743 of 19 September 2013, pp. 4–7 and see Bundesminis-
terium des Inneren (Federal Ministry for the Interior), Flutkatastrophe 2013, Katalog der Hilfeleistungen, 
Deutscher Bundestage 17.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 17/14743, p. 13.
16 For a further discussion on the compensation for victims of disasters in Italy, see Monti and Chiaves 
(2006, pp. 169–192).
17 See http://www.prote zione civil e.gov.it/jcms.
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The goal of this WTS was to offer a more structural solution to compensate victims 
of catastrophes instead of ad hoc responses. There are two ways of compensation 
under the WTS. There is a right to compensation for damage in case of fresh water 
flooding or earthquakes that are considered to be a catastrophe or a large-scale inci-
dent in the sense set out in the act. However, Article 3 of the WTS provides that it 
can also be declared applicable through a Royal Decree which can come into being 
only if the government considers the incident a catastrophe or a large-scale incident. 
The Parliamentary Proceedings make it clear that such an incident at least requires 
that many governmental organisations and services of various disciplines must have 
intervened in a coordinated way and that the incident has endangered the health of 
many people and caused substantial damage.18 In other words, the damage has to 
be catastrophic. Article 4(3) of the WTS stipulates that the victim is not entitled to 
compensation if the damage was reasonably insurable or if the victim was able to 
obtain compensation from another source.
Since its creation in 1998 the WTS has only been applied five times19: it was 
applied twice in the case of heavy rain (in 1998), twice in the case of flooding of the 
river Maas (2003 and 2011) and once for the dike break at Wilnis already referred 
to above (in 2003). Since heavy rain did not constitute a formal flood in the sense of 
Article 1 of the WTS, the WTS needed to be declared applicable by Royal Decree 
(Bruggeman et  al. 2011, p. 776). The WTS has been criticised for the fact that it 
applies merely in cases of heavy rainfall and flooding but not in cases of serious 
man-made disasters resulting in major personal injuries such as the fireworks acci-
dent in Enschede in 2000 and a fire in a café in Volendam on New Year’s Eve (2000-
2001). Both cases led to substantial personal injury. In the latter cases it was not the 
WTS that intervened but again the government, which used taxpayers’ money to 
provide compensation (Bruggeman et al. 2011, p. 776).
The following amounts were paid under the WTS:
1. Heavy rainfall 1998—EUR 147.209.966
2. Heavy rainfall 1998—EUR 115.268.597
3. Flooding Maas 2003—EUR 3.691.642
4. Dike break Wilnis 2003—EUR 2.159.738
5. Flooding Maas 2011—EUR 1.115.647
Again, even these few cases illustrate the point that compensation is awarded 
via the WTS only when the damage is high. Note, however, that also outside of the 
WTS substantial amounts are paid to victims when the number of victims and/or 
the damage is high. In the case (mentioned above) of the explosion of the fireworks 
factory in Enschede a total amount of approximately 90 million guilders (EUR 45 
million) was paid by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a foundation Financial 
Aid Fireworks Castastrophe (Faure and Hartlief 2006, p. 220), and in the case of 
18 Documents of the Second Chamber of Representatives 1996–1997, 25 159 No 3, 4–5.
19 See email of Mr. G.W. Knops of the Ministry of the Environment of 24 March 2017.
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Volendam the central government made a total of EUR 30,1 million available to the 
victims (Faure and Hartlief 2006, p. 221).
The difficulty of incentivising public authorities
We have seen that under comparative negligence the victim only has perverse incen-
tives if the government cannot be incentivised to take care. The question arises as 
to how realistic this is. For the sake of comparison, we start with a situation where 
there is no public authority liability.
Incentives without public authority liability
Do public authorities have an incentive to prevent careless behaviour without the 
threat of liability? One may argue that the political consequences of harmful behav-
iour for the government can serve as a deterrent. If costs are externalised to citizens, 
this may affect their voting behaviour. In reality, however, the political consequences 
of cost externalisation may be limited. Voters may not act as an effective check on 
liability for several reasons: accidents may happen infrequently, voters will often be 
ill-informed about them, and even if well-informed, voters probably view the prob-
lem of uncompensated injuries caused by the state to be less important than other 
issues. Also, the costs of uncompensated injuries may fall disproportionately on 
poorer segments of the population with limited political power. In other words, the 
cost externalisation strategy of the government may end up undetected or at least 
unpunished by the voters (see Kramer and Sykes 1987, p. 279).
Incentives with public authority liability
Economic analysis traditionally assumes utility maximising individuals and profit 
maximising firms. These assumptions are crucial to making predictions about how 
private entities respond to the incentives created by liability. Public authorities, 
however, unlike corporations, do not maximise profits.20 As a result, public authori-
ties may also lack the market discipline which is imposed on private injurers, and 
traditional incentive mechanisms may therefore not work (Levinson 2000, p. 345; 
Spitzer 1977, p. 515). If profit maximisation is not the goal of a public authority, 
it is less clear what objective functions public authorities strive for (see Posner and 
Sykes 2007, p. 87). The question to what extent imposing liability would provide 
incentives (e.g., to prevent harmful behaviour) is of course crucially linked to the 
functions the particular agent strives for (Dari-Mattiacci et al. 2010, p. 16). Schäfer 
(2012) states that the behaviour of public authorities should be analysed via the 
incentives of their main actors, in the first instance politicians. Their main concern 
is not profit maximisation but re-election, and as a result, they would tend to benefit 
interest groups that support their re-election.
20 Schäfer (2012), Van den Bergh and Schäfer (1998, 2000), and Van den Bergh (2010). For a compara-
tive law and economics analysis of public authority liability see Markesinis et al. (1999).
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While public authorities are indeed quite different to individual actors, conclud-
ing that public authority liability may never have any deterrent effect is probably 
too strong a conclusion. In the end some government entity must pay the costs cre-
ated by liability. This entity will often face a budget constraint and will not want to 
waste resources. According to some (e.g., Kramer and Sykes 1987), a hard budget 
constraint may lead bureaucracies to respond to liability with behaviour approximat-
ing cost minimisation, which would lead them to adopt cost-effective measures to 
economise on liability.21 According to this line of thought, the government (or more 
accurately, its officials) can be motivated by the desire to provide public services at 
minimum cost, since many officials confront demands for both increased levels of 
public services and lower taxes. This would make it more likely that officials would 
explore all opportunities for cost reduction. Taking reasonable preventive measures 
to reduce the burdens of liability would be one such opportunity. While we agree 
that in some cases liability may affect the behaviour of government officials through 
its political consequences, nothing guarantees that the political ranking of poten-
tial projects a government takes on will be the same as (or even close to) a social 
ranking of potential projects. Liability diverts government funds and leaves politi-
cal officials with fewer resources to satisfy the demands of their constituencies (see 
Dari-Mattiacci et al. 2010, p. 16). Governments may then respond to liability with 
measures to avoid it that are “politically cost-effective” but not necessarily “eco-
nomically cost-effective” (see Posner and Sykes 2007, p. 89). And although it is 
not unrealistic to expect a positive correlation between political and economic cost-
effectiveness, the exact relation between them is unclear (Posner and Sykes 2007, p. 
90). A situation in which liability could be effective is one in which the following 
conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the cost of preventive measures is relatively 
low; the cost of potential injuries falls disproportionately on segments of the popula-
tion with limited political power22; and there is a high probability that if these pre-
ventive measures are not taken, there will be substantial losses in the near future.23 
In the context of disasters, however, given that liability procedures may only take 
effect years after the politician was in office, a finding of liability ex post may not 
affect incentives ex ante very much.24 The political consequences of liability can 
thus be limited due to timing distortions (see also Dari-Mattiacci et al. 2010, p. 16). 
Losses may be revealed only years later, and trials or settlement negotiations may 
take a long time. In such cases, the political cost may not be paid by the elected 
official who took the decision ending in the tort payment but rather by a later entrant 
into office.25
21 Unfortunately, there is no empirical data available to support this thesis.
22 If costs fell on segments of the population with substantial political power, pure political incentives 
would most likely lead to the adoption of preventive measures, and liability would not add much pres-
sure.
23 Which would mean that the politicians currently in office would have less financial resources to sat-
isfy the demands of groups with more political power.
24 It is related to the well-known Nimtof syndrom (not in my term of office).
25 We must stress, however, that this may be mitigated due to the presence of bureaucrats, who often 
have a longer time perspective than elected officials. The most commonly applied rational choice model 
of bureaucratic behaviour assumes that a bureaucrat will seek to maximise the size of the agency’s 
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Furthermore, governments do not necessarily face hard budget constraints. While 
we have argued above that liability may have some incentivising effect on govern-
ments in some situations, this is less likely if governments can simply pay liability 
losses with increased taxes, spreading the loss over millions of taxpayers.26 Also, 
due to internal budgetary reasons, liability costs are not always directly or propor-
tionally charged to the responsible department, so that they do not face direct eco-
nomic incentives to limit their exposure to liability. Many commentators believe 
that if agency budgets were charged for payment, departments and agencies would 
respond more to the threat of liability ex ante by internalising the costs of their neg-
ligent behaviour (Schuck 1983, p. 104; Emery and Maazel 2000, pp. 596–600).27 
This could mean that public authority liability may work better for municipalities 
than for central governments. The logic is that in a municipality the citizens may be 
more directly confronted with the consequences of municipal liability (in the form 
of increased municipal taxes). At the municipal level, monitoring by citizens is also 
easier, and therefore the reaction is quicker when a municipal authority is found to 
be liable. Since the link between citizens and the state is much more remote, the 
same monitoring and incentive effects may not be present to the same extent in case 
of liability of the state for actions of state agencies. However, there is an important 
caveat. The law may stipulate that local governments that are unable to balance their 
books will be bailed out by the central government. In that case, local governments 
do not face a hard budget constraint, because they expect a higher level of govern-
ment to support them in case of financial distress. A soft budget constraint will 
weaken a local government’s incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking. Note, how-
ever, that the central government may have several mechanisms in place to limit this 
problem (e.g., vertical financial supervision, the prospect that the municipality will 
be under forced administration in case of a bailout, etc.).
budget (see Niskanen 1971, pp. 36–42). The reason is that the size of an agency’s budget is likely to cor-
relate positively with some goods that bureaucrats may value, such as their own compensation and per-
quisites, prospects for career advancement and prestige). They may thus have an incentive to take reason-
able precautions in order to reduce the burdens of liability, even though they are not directly politically 
accountable and even though elected officials may have little control over the actions of these bureaucrats 
(in terms of selection, promotion, operation).
Footnote 25 (continued)
26 In that case, politicians in office do not have to worry about the risk that they will not be able to sat-
isfy the demands of groups with substantial political power, even if liability losses were quite large.
27 Fougere (2010) examines who pays the liability costs of state correctional agencies in 15 U.S. states. 
He finds that states use a variety of approaches to pay claims against their agencies—ranging from a 
state-wide judgement fund to charging the agency budget. The author hypothesises that if a more direct 
source of money impacts cost internalisation and promotes better policy at the agency, then cases filed 
against them should be fewer in number because victims should have less cause to sue. Indeed, he 
finds that there are significantly fewer filings in the “Budget” states than in other states. As the author 
acknowledges, however, the use of filings as a proxy for ex ante cost internalisation is rough and most 
probably imperfect. Many other factors influence filing rates. Fougere (2010).
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Comparative negligence
The doctrine of comparative negligence reduces the compensation obtained by the 
victim of a wrong if the victim was partly to blame for their own damage. A judge 
who makes a finding of comparative negligence must assess the respective shares of 
responsibility for the damage as two percentages that add up to 100%. The shares of 
responsibility are determined by reference to the comparative blameworthiness of 
the parties and the relative causative potency of their faulty conduct.
In our model perverse incentives are more likely, since the share of the harm the 
victim obtains in compensation increases if both the government and the victim 
took insufficient care. Recent empirical research in England and Wales shows that 
for a variety of tort cases the most popular discounts are fractions commonly used 
in everyday life: one-half, one-third, one-quarter. Judges use the full spectrum of 
discounts, but discounts at the higher end are relatively infrequent. The average dis-
count is significantly smaller than 50% (40.5%) (Goudkamp and Nolan 2016).
The finding that defendants on average bear a larger portion of the harm than vic-
tims could mean two things. First, it could be that the blameworthiness or the causa-
tive potency of the defendant’s faulty conduct is larger on average. Second, there 
could be a bias against (some types of) defendants in the tort system. Indeed, both 
archival analyses and mock jury experimentation find that, in similar cases, corpora-
tions and governments are treated differently from individuals (MacCoun 1993).
As a consequence, the corrective features of a comparative negligence defence 
may largely fail, also in the particular case of disasters. We indicated that either ex 
post recovery via solidarity payments or ex post public authority liability may create 
perverse incentives for victims to increase damages. The hypothesis we examined 
is whether using public authority liability rather than ex post solidarity payments 
would be preferred, given that theoretically a tort system (under public authority 
liability) could correct the victims’ perverse incentives via a comparative negligence 
defence, whereas that is not possible in the case of solidarity payments. However, 
in practice there is a large reluctance on the side of the judiciary to fully apply the 
comparative negligence defence (i.e., to effectively reduce the compensation due to 
the victim), taking into account the victim’s contribution to the disaster or to the 
damage. If that is indeed the case, as we argued here, then public authority liability 
(with a comparative negligence defence), due also to the elements previously dis-
cussed and the element we discuss in the next section, may not be able to effectively 
counter the victim’s perverse incentives.
The problem of suits with a negative expected value and suits with a low positive 
expected value
In the solidarity system the perverse incentive of the victim to take no care would 
not exist if the victim was compensated for relatively low levels of harm as well. 
At first sight, under a system of comparative negligence the victims will not have 
such a perverse incentive, because they will also be compensated for relatively low 
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levels of harm when the government fails to take care. However, the fact that litiga-
tion is costly affects the viability of suits with low levels of harm much more than 
suits with larger levels of harm. When victims suffer a relatively small loss, their suit 
often has a negative expected value, leaving the victim empty-handed, just as in the 
solidarity system. And even if the suit has a positive expected value, the expected 
value may be quite low due to the cost of litigation. Consequently, settlement offers 
may also be considerably lower than the harm suffered.
Of course, there are several legal rules and market-based instruments that can 
mitigate the problem of a meritorious but negative expected value suit not being 
filed or a meritorious suit obtaining a settlement offer much lower than the expected 
judgement. A first example concerns (public) legal aid and (private) legal expenses 
insurance. However, in many countries only a relatively small percentage of the pop-
ulation is covered by legal aid or legal expenses insurance (De Mot et al. 2016). A 
second example concerns contingency fees. Under such fees, lawyers are not paid 
when they lose the case, but they receive a fraction of the award when they win the 
case. However, two remarks are in order. When the costs of pursuing a claim are 
large compared to the amount at stake, it will generally not be in a lawyer’s interest 
to take the case on a contingency fee basis. Second, especially in civil law countries, 
contingency fees are often prohibited (see Faure et al. 2010). A third example con-
cerns fee shifting. In theory, when the losing party at trial needs to reimburse the 
legal fees of the winning party, one can expect that a larger amount of strong, low-
value claims will be filed. However, in many countries28 fee shifting is only partial, 
leaving the winning party with still a relatively large portion of uncompensated legal 
fees. Second, a plaintiff with a strong case may still be deterred from filing a lawsuit 
if the defendant’s legal expenditures at trial are relatively large. Given that a plaintiff 
can never be entirely sure that they will win at trial, there is a possibility in such a 
case that they will end up paying a large amount of the legal fees.29
Conclusion
The existing economic literature related to compensation for victims of disasters 
indicates that ex post compensation by the government is problematic because 
it has a perverse effect on the incentives for prevention. These incentives may be 
diluted, since victims will count on government intervention. Moreover, the ex post 
government intervention may equally dilute incentives to insure. In this paper we 
discussed an additional problem: victims may have an interest in a relatively large 
harm precisely to guarantee the solidarity payment from the government, given that 
governments are typically more likely to intervene when the harm caused by a dis-
aster is relatively large. This may further dilute the incentive of victims to invest in 
prevention.
28 E.g., Belgium and the Netherlands.
29 For an overview of the economics of fee shifting, see Katz and Sanchirico (2011).
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We addressed the question whether it is possible to counter these perverse incen-
tives through public authority liability. We have argued that theoretically this is cer-
tainly the case. With public authority liability, suits can also be brought when the 
harm is relatively low, since there is no particular threshold under liability law. And 
if victims had underinvested in prevention, this could be corrected via the compara-
tive negligence defence. However, we argued that reality may be much more com-
plex. In countries where solidarity payments are used (such as in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Italy and Germany) these payments are most often used when the harm is 
relatively great. From a political economy perspective, this is also understandable: 
only when the harm is great and therefore a large number of voters are affected can 
politicians reap substantial benefits from solidarity payments. We also highlighted 
that the incentive effects of public authority liability may be relatively low. In prac-
tice, judges very often do not apply the comparative negligence defence to the full 
extent. For individual victims a public authority liability lawsuit may also have a 
negative expected value or a relatively low positive expected value. As a result, there 
is no guarantee that the potentially perverse incentives of victims would be cor-
rected through public authority liability. Our paper may provide support for what 
has often been argued in the literature,30 namely that the only effective solution for 
the disaster compensation of victims that keeps incentives intact is the introduction 
of a comprehensive insurance coverage accompanied by the government’s reinsur-
ance for catastrophic risk.
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